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Foreword: Out From Under the Shadow of the Federal Constitution: An Overlooked
American Constitutionalism
Christian G. Fritz
Introduction
Most scholars of constitutional law and history equate American constitutionalism with the
Federal constitution. This spotlight on the Federal constitution rests on a series of modern
assumptions that elevate the status of the Federal constitution over the rich history of state
constitutions, and inevitably neglect the central constitutional tenet of the American
Revolution—the sovereignty of the people. Viewing American constitutionalism from the
perspective of the constitutional legacy of the Revolution suggests a modified paradigm in which
state constitutions play a critical role in our understanding the full meaning of American
constitutionalism. The American Revolution established that henceforth, in America,
governments rested on the sovereignty of the people. All American patriots accepted the fact that
the foundational source of governmental power derived from the collective sovereignty of the
people. Consensus on this principle, however, did not produce a consensus on what that
principle meant or how the principle might be employed. At times, Post-Revolutionary
Americans emphasized an actual, active, and ongoing role for the people while at other times the
collective sovereign was depicted in more theoretical, passive, and residual terms. In short, all
could agree on the sovereignty of the people, but just what that principle meant eluded a shared
understanding.1
A broader conception of American ―constitutionalism‖ requires coming to terms with the
constitutional legacy of the Revolution—the sovereignty of the people—and allows for a full
exploration of the varied experiences of all of America‘s written constitutions. The challenges
presented by the concept of a collective sovereign during the early years of the American
republic were more profound than most commentators have acknowledged. There was, of
course, the basic question of identity: who were the people2 and how did one recognize when
they had spoken authoritatively? The idea of a collective sovereign introduced a tension and
implicit challenge to one of the most sacrosanct constitutional values that we take for granted
today—the rule of law as written and enforced by elected officials. The acknowledgment of
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sovereignty linked to the authority of the people opened up the possibility that the collective
sovereign might be expressed without such constraints. The claims for a broader popular
authority—reflected in the slogan of vox populi, vox dei (the voice of the people is the voice of
God) and its corollary commitment to the rule of raw majoritarianism would today be rejected
out of hand as inconsistent with our notion of codified proceduralism as one of the cornerstones
of the modern notion of the rule of law. Such a perspective was hardly so clear, unequivocal, and
uncontested during the early years of our Republic. Initially, the powerful constitutional idea and
vocabulary of a collective sovereign as often expressed in the Post-Revolutionary period could
(and did) push and pull people in various ways and produced a far more complicated calculus
than we are willing to entertain today. Nonetheless, the historical experience with written
constitutions in America suggests that the rule of law, as written and administered by
representatives of the people, was not so inevitable to all Americans of earlier generations,
particularly among those willing to extend the logic of the sovereignty of the people to its fullest
extent.
This article starts by describing the conventional paradigm of American constitutionalism—
focused on the creation and interpretation of the Federal constitution. That view, however, fails
to consider the rich American experience with the formulation and revision of state constitutions,
while elevating the Federal constitution as the ultimate American model. The article then
suggests why a more complete paradigm that fully integrates state constitution-making facilitates
our understanding of the meaning of the early struggle of the American people to exercise their
constitutionally based ―sovereign‖ power to govern themselves, in all of its shapes and forms.
That understanding is important as we continue to grapple with the legitimacy of invoking the
direct and affirmative exercise of that sovereignty in the context of modern political life.
I. The Conventional Paradigm of American Constitutionalism
The study of American constitutional history has long been dominated by the study of the
Framers of the Federal constitution, the document they produced, and its subsequent
interpretation.3 Those interested in the political theory of American constitutional government
routinely limit themselves to the ideas of the Framers and the debates surrounding the ratification
3

The standard texts on American constitutional history are illustrative. See, e.g., ALFRED H. KELLY et al., THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (6th ed. 1983; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF
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See also BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY (Richard
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AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1(2009). See also Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition
Revisited: Preliminary Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth Century West, 25 RUTGERS L.J.
945, 957-60 (1994) (noting tendency to regard Federal constitution as a paradigm).
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of the Federal constitution.4 Indeed, the study of The Federalist Papers has become a cottage
industry, a major sub-field of American constitutional thought.5 Thus, for most scholars, political
thinking about the Federal constitution remains the basic, if not exclusive, source for
understanding ―American‖ constitutionalism.6
Imbedded in the conventional paradigm is the widely accepted belief that American
constitutionalism experienced a crucial transition of ideas between Independence and the
framing of the Federal constitution, best exemplified in Gordon Wood‘s extremely influential
book The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787.7 Wood believes that although
Americans toyed with different ideas after the Revolution, the Federal constitution of 1787
represented a new ―science of politics‖—a matured understanding of how to create popularlybased governments through constitutional conventions and popular ratification that had garnered
a consensus among Americans about constitutions and their formation.8 In fairness to Wood, his
work focused on the period 1776 to 1787. Although the Federal constitution formed the endpoint
for his study, Wood implied that American thinking about written constitutions by the late 1780s
was fully formed. Scholars examining periods after the formation of the Federal constitution
4

See e.g., CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 1988); MICHAEL A
GILLESPIE & MICHAEL LEINESCH, RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION (1989); DAVID A. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2003), 5 (―Any account of American constitutionalism, after all, must explain what it is about
the Constitution that raises it above ordinary politics‖) See also, Alison L. Lacroix, The Authority for Federalism:
Madison‟s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 452 (2010) (noting the
scholarly tendency to regard the Federal Convention as ―a sui generis moment of genius that set the terms of debate
but that resists efforts to place it in a broader temporal context extending before, as well as after, 1787.‖)
5

See e.g. , CHARLES A. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST (1948); A.T. Mason, The Federalist-A Split
Personality, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 634 (1952); Douglas Adair, ―That Politics May be Reduced to a Science”: David
Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTINGTON LIBR. Q. 343 (1957); GARY WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981); DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF The Federalist (1984); SAVING
THE REVOLUTION: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Charles R. Kesler ed., 1987); MORTON
WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, The Federalist, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
6

A good example is DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,
1789-1888 (1985). Even when constitutional law scholars have criticized the emphasis given to the role of the courts
in the constitutional system, the focus invariably remains on the Federal constitution. See e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). The leading textbooks on constitutional law also reflect that focus. See, e.g.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Kathleen M. Sullivan ed., 16 ed. 2007); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Geoffrey R. Stone et al.
eds., 2ed. 1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed., 1988).
7

GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Wood‘s work has been called
the ―indispensable book‖ and the ―classic study‖ on the period from the Revolution to the Federal Constitution. See
Stephen A. Conrad, The Rhetorical Constitution of 'Civil Society' at the Founding: One Lawyer's Anxious Vision,
72 IND. L.J. 335, 368 (1997); Michael Les Benedict, Constitutional History and Constitutional Theory: Reflections
on Ackerman, Reconstruction, and the Transformation of the American Constitution, 108 YALE L.J 2011, 2031
(1999).
8

For Wood‘s discussion of the ―American science of politics,‖ see WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
at 593-615. See also Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of the Bill of Rights, 101 PROC. AM. ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY 264
(1992).

3

routinely extrapolate from Wood‘s study and assume the prevailing influence in these later
periods of the ideas Wood attributes to the 1780s.
The overwhelming majority of the modern literature analyzing American constitutionalism,
whether by historians, political scientists, or legal scholars, accepts the Wood paradigm, despite
the fact that later constitutional disputes and debates in state constitutional conventions before
the Civil War (which Wood‘s study did not examine) demonstrate that the federal model of 1787
did not hold sway in later periods.9
Few authors challenge that the Federal constitution marked the endpoint of constitutional
ideas from 1776 to 1787 or that the Federal constitution reflected the ―matured‖ understanding of
Americans at the Founding about the nature of written constitutions.10 Consequently, it is hardly
surprising that federal and state courts routinely embrace The Creation of the American Republic
as reflecting the proper viewpoint of American constitutionalism.11 Even so, a distinct and rich
state constitutional tradition resting on the authority of the people always existed, and has
continued to develop throughout our history. Thus, any attempt to describe American
constitutionalism must also include the rich and varied experiences of the creation and
amendment of state constitutions.
Nonetheless, the prevailing sense remains that events at the state level are of little
significance for understanding American constitutionalism, and there are three circumstances
that reinforce that general viewpoint: first, is the natural pre-eminence of the Federal
constitution, in the wake of the historical growth of federal power, and the expansion of federal
constitutional rights; second, is the denigration of the importance of the first post-revolutionary
state constitutions; and third, is the failure to appreciate that the different shape and content of
modern state constitutions does not detract from the importance of the traditions that have
developed in their formation and amendment. A fair evaluation of each frees us from the
exclusive focus on the Federal constitution and opens a path to a more complete understanding
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of American constitutionalism, which includes, as it must, the rich tradition found in the history
of state constitutions and the struggle over the role of the people as the collective sovereign.
A. The Pre-eminence of the Federal Constitution
During its first seventy-five years of existence, the national government created under the
Federal constitution played a relatively small role in the lives of most Americans.12 Until the
Civil War (and even after), state and local governments created and operating under state
constitutions had a far larger role in the lives of their citizens. The historian Phillip Paludan has
summarized the pre-Civil War situation as follows,
The national government did not tax the public at large. It had no powers in matters of
health, education, welfare, morals, sanitation, safety, or local transportation. In short,
practically every activity that affected the lives of Americans was the province of either
state or local government—and more often than not it was local.13
As summarized by the legal historian Lawrence Friedman, ―during most of American history,
economic and social development—not to mention conflict and dispute—centered on the
states.‖14 In contrast, ―little was expected of the national government‖ during the nineteenth
century.15
After the Civil War, and more particularly during the course of the twentieth century, the
development of federal power under the federal constitution, coupled with the growth of federal
judicial review and the expansion of the federal bill of rights as a primary protector of
individuals from the unwarranted actions of state government, has led to an historical focus on
federal rather than state constitutional matters. As the historian Richard Beeman has noted:
Within the historical community in general there has been an understandable inclination
to go where the action is, and the steady growth of federal power has quite naturally led
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As Don Fehrenbacher has put it, nineteenth-century state constitution-making ―is completely terra incognita for
most Americans in spite of the fact that until well after the Civil War, state governments had considerably more
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See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SLAVEHOLDING SOUTH (1989), 2.
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1013 at 1021 (1972).
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the nerve center of the nation, but more like a dinosaur‘s tiny mind, a clump of nerves in a vast, decentralized
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historians to conclude that most of the action has been occurring within the various
branches of the federal government.16
Given the over-arching and pervasive presence of the national government in the lives of
Americans today, it is understandable that the constitution under whose authority that
government has expanded would garner the most attention, with the result that the Federal
constitution has become the symbol of American constitutionalism.17 The perceived primacy of
the Federal constitution in the lives of modern Americans, however, does not justify the
widespread neglect of the history of state constitution-making as part of the tradition of
American constitutionalism.
B. Historical Reputation of the First State Constitutions
Most modern observers question the constitutional legitimacy of the earliest American
constitutions that emerged without special conventions followed by ratification. Historians,
political scientists, and legal scholars largely agree that state constitution-makers in the early
revolutionary period failed to distinguish fundamental from ordinary law because they did not
use procedures later associated with the creation of constitutions.18 According to this view,
Americans during the Revolutionary period either experienced ―confusion‖ about creating
fundamental law or ―unfamiliarity with constitution-making.‖19 The political scientist Donald
Lutz asserts that ―the distinction between normal legislation and extraordinary political acts such
as the design and approval of constitutions was only partial in 1776.‖20 The historian Jack
Rakove considers the early state constitutions ―not truly constitutional at all,‖21 because they
16

RICHARD R. BEEMAN, , Introduction, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY, 18.
17

For how the Federal constitution predominates in the popular iconography of American constitutionalism, see
MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1986).
18

See, e.g., WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING
OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 64, 69, 72, 75 (1980); Peter S. Onuf, State-Making in
Revolutionary America: Independent Vermont as a Case Study, 67 J. AM. HIST 797, 813 (1981); FORREST
MCDONALD, STATES‘ RIGHTS AND THE UNION: IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 8 (2000); AKHIL REED AMAR,
AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 287 (2005) (suggesting ―a strong argument could be made‖ that the first
state constitutions ―were little more than fancy statutes‖).
19

Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911
(1993); John V. Orth, „Fundamental Principles' in North Carolina Constitutional History, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1357,
1358 (1991).
20

DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 99 (1988). Because the first state constitutions
were not ―written by specially elected conventions and ratified by the people,‖ Lutz rejected the view that
Americans appreciated fundamental law from the start of the Revolution. See LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND
POPULAR CONTROL 64. See also Orth, „Fundamental Principles' in North Carolina Constitutional History 1357,
1358 (asserting the distinction between ordinary and fundamental law ―not yet clearly marked‖ by 1776); RUSSELL
L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION 13 (1988)
(describing most state constitutions as ordinary legislation).
21
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―rested on no authority greater than ordinary acts of legislation.‖22 Early state constitutionmakers were engaged in ―a hasty experiment‖ at a time when they had not yet ―fully learned to
regard a written constitution as supreme fundamental law.‖23 Thus, the first state constitutions
lacked constitutional legitimacy because ―a true constitution required its formation by a body
appointed for that purpose alone, and then ratified by the people.‖24
To the extent early state constitution-making departed from the expected procedural steps
embodied in the federal model, those first state constitutions invite denigration that is wholly
unjustified. Although some Americans at the time called for constitutional conventions and
others for popular ratification, most of America‘s first constitutions were drafted under exigent
circumstances by revolutionary conventions without ratification. The revolutionary conventions
made executive, legislative, and even judicial decisions and drafted the constitution for the
revolutionary government. The consent of the people supporting the revolutionary cause gave
these conventions their authority, including the power to promulgate constitutions. Only after
these constitutions established governments for the new states would formal legislative branches
emerge.25
Early American constitution-makers knew what made a constitution legitimate.26 Many
traced their new constitutions‘ legitimacy to special elections that preceded the conventions. The
people elected these conventions with knowledge that one thing the convention could do was
write the constitution. A legitimate constitution depended on whether the sovereign people
authorized it, not whether a particular procedure was used or whether revolutionary conventions
were free of other responsibilities, such as passing ordinary legislation. It was the people as the
collective sovereign who authorized drafting those first constitutions that gave them their
legitimacy, not whether they used procedures that matched what was later understood to be
necessary to create fundamental law.27

22

JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 129 (1996).
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Rakove, The Super-Legality of the Constitution 1940.
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Jack N. Rakove, Thinking Like a Constitution, 24 J. EARLY AM. REPUBLIC 1, 13 (2004). These assessments, based
on the lack of the convention/ratification model in the early state constitutions, fail to acknowledge that the early
state constitutional methodologies persisted long after the so-called federal ―model‖ of 1787. Thus, the assumptions
underlying the canonical story of constitutional developments from 1776 to 1787 have encouraged a presentism that
assumes a (nonexistent) straight and inexorable line between the ideas of the Federal Founding and our ideas of
constitutionalism today.
25
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Even some who question the legitimacy of the early state constitutions acknowledge that the provincial congresses
enacting them ―were not altogether unaware of the special character of these ‗laws.‘ ‖ ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS 64.
27

See MARC W. KRUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 1-33 (1997); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sovereignty
and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 322–29 (1997). While some Americans
objected to constitutions framed without popular ratification or a special convention, this was not a common concern
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The revolutionaries focused on substance, not form, in drafting constitutions. All but two
of the eleven first state constitutions emerged from revolutionary conventions after
representatives to those bodies were specially elected for that purpose or elected with the
common understanding that they would create a constitution for the state. The two states that did
not hold elections before their legislatures promulgated their initial constitutions were South
Carolina and Virginia. Even without such elections, people in those states assumed that by
electing representatives in favor of independence they were also authorizing the creation of a
constitution, albeit a temporary one. Indeed, Americans widely accepted the people as the source
of constitutions even if they disagreed about the process of constitution-making.28
Today the idea that we know the will of the sovereign primarily through the use of
specific formal procedures—such as elections and constitutional amendment—seems selfevident. For the revolutionary generation this was not immediately apparent. The recent
experience of their successful revolution clearly taught them that proceduralism was not the only
way to recognize when the sovereign had spoken. Often during the Revolution there was no way
that traditionally accepted procedures could lend legitimacy to their struggle. Proceduralism
provided one way, but not the only way, to confirm that the people had expressed their will. But
with military victory, applying the principle of the collective sovereign‘s ability to act directly,
without the aid of procedural verification, became a growing source of dispute for America‘s
leaders, and between those leaders and some of their constituents.
One instance of the supple utility of the authority of the people to overcome supposedly
mandatory procedures came with the revision of Pennsylvania‘s 1776 Constitution. Critics of
that constitution were stymied in their efforts for constitutional change. They had been unable to
muster the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds vote by a Council of Censors that only met
every seven years to consider whether or not to hold a new constitutional convention. By 1790
those critics controlled the legislature and they bypassed the 1776 constitution‘s requirements for
constitutional change by initiating a convention themselves. They argued that ―the people‖ as the
sovereign could replace the existing constitution without following its procedures, and called for
elections of delegates to a constitutional convention that created a new constitution for the
state.29 This was precisely the same tactic that had been used to replace the Articles of
Confederation with the Federal constitution.30

during the initial period of constitution-making and invariably arose as an afterthought. FRITZ, AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNS, 35.
28

FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, 31-35.
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For Pennsylvania‘s constitution-making in 1790, see J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF
1776: A STUDY IN REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY; ROBERT L. BRUNHOUSE, THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1790 at 221-27 (1942, repr. 1971); THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING THE
CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790. THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FRAMED THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION
OF PENNSYLVANIA 129, 133 (1825).
30
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It is important to appreciate that for Americans of earlier generations the issue of
constitutional revision and change was not so clear or simple as it is often depicted today.
Americans living before the Civil War acknowledged the role and utilization of procedure and
process in the course of framing or changing constitutions. Importantly however, Americans
engaged in constitution-making before the Civil War did not assume that using such procedures
was the exclusive means through which constitutional change could be accomplished by
invoking the sovereign authority of the people.
Thus, the lack of a uniform convention/ratification system for state constitutional creation
in the early days of the republic is not grounds for ignoring the rich traditions developed in early
state constitution-making, rooted in the sovereignty of the people. Any complete description of
American constitutionalism must take into account the force of those early successful efforts at a
constitutional order founded on the authority of a collective sovereign.
C. Modern Reputation of State Constitutions
The Federal constitution exhibits two key characteristics: brevity and permanence. In
contrast, what characterizes most state constitutions today is the amount of detail (often referred
to as ―constitutional legislation‖) coupled with an ease and frequency of amendment. The length
and detail of many of state constitutions is often contrasted unfavorably with the much shorter
Federal constitution,31 supposedly free of such constitutional legislation.32 The existence of
constitutional legislation strikes the modern constitutional commentator as incongruous in a
document considered to be fundamental law and whose rightful character is presumed to be
concerned with more general principles and broad outlines for governmental operation.33 The
legal historian Willard Hurst, writing in 1950, anticipated scholars of today when he asserted that
an ideal constitution only contained ―fundamentals‖ and that constitutional legislation
31

Critics point to provisions like the those that forfeit legislative office for accepting a railroad pass, see, e.g., New
Mexico 1912 Constitution, Art. IV, sec 37 reprinted in 7 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 104 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979), without considering the value of such passes, and the
contemporary purpose of such provisions to prevent railroads from corrupting the legislative process. See also
Oklahoma 1907 Constitution, Art. XX, sec 2 reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS 159 (providing that the ―flash test‖ for ―all kerosene oil for illuminating purposes shall be 115
degrees Fahrenheit.‖
32

G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1998) (noting that the typical state constitutions is
over three times the length of the Federal constitution). While the Federal constitution contains less legislative
matter than do many state constitutions, it is hardly free of constitutional legislation, including its provisions
protecting slavery. See, e.g. Art. I sec 8 (―Congress shall have power…To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,
and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures; To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting
the Securities and current Coin of the United States‖), Art. I sec 9 (‗The Migration or Importation of such Persons as
any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten
dollars for each Person.‖).
33

WILLIAMS, LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 24 (identifying ―the view that a state constitution should
legitimately limit itself to provisions structuring and allocating governmental powers and limiting those powers to
protect the people‖).
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undermined the ―dignity‖ of state constitutions.34 The legal scholar A.E. Dick Howard also
captured this view when he observed:
Whatever the reasons for the great length and detail of the typical state constitution,
commentators speak with one voice when they submit that such detail is simply not
compatible with the traditional assumption that a constitution is properly the repository
of the fundamental ordering principles of society, and that all else should be left to the
statute books.35
The second perceived praiseworthy characteristic of the Federal constitution—its
permanence—has also helped to undermine the reputation of state constitutions as fundamental
law because of their ease and frequency of revision. John Vile, a political scientist and a leading
scholar of the Federal constitution‘s revision process, has commented favorably on the adoption
by the Federal Framers of a constitutional revision process, operating in ―vivid contrast‖ to the
states‘ experience with more frequent constitutional changes.36 His assumption that infrequent
constitutional change best accords with the nature of constitutionalism is shared by many other
scholars who believe that the frequent change of state constitutions ―denigrates‖ them and
signifies a constitution‘s ill health.37 Indeed, more than a few scholars have questioned whether
today‘s state constitutions—given their detail and frequent amendment—even deserve the name
―constitutions.‖38
A normative argument can certainly be made for avoiding frequent and continual
constitutional changes, but one cannot ignore the counter view that ease of revision serves
34
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important purposes at the state level and is premised on a foundational principle of American
constitutionalism—the right of the people to alter their governments at will. Ultimately,
Americans developed competing views over the ease of amending constitutions, while agreeing
that their constitutions would continue to improve.39
The critics of ease in amendment fail to appreciate the manner in which state
constitution-making served as a vibrant and shifting arena for crucial constitutional
conversations of an engaged citizenry. The key to understanding the growing length of
nineteenth and early twentieth-century constitutions lies in their framers‘ understanding that one
of the principal purposes of the constitutions they were drafting was to impose limits—
substantive as well as procedural—on the powers of state legislatures. Although post-eighteenth
century state constitution-makers debated the value of adopting so-called constitutional
legislation, ultimately convention delegates defended the need and propriety of placing such
material in the fundamental law of the states when necessary to constrain state or private
institutional power. Restraining corporations and limiting governmental debt provided the most
dramatic nineteenth century expression of the need for constitution-based constraints. In the case
of controlling corporate power, including railroads, conventions asserted that legislatures were
institutionally incapable of responding. Moreover, many delegates regarded the control of
corporations and debt as matters on which the people had given conventions a mandate to act.40
For many state constitutional delegates, the constitutional control of particular legislative
matters was less a departure from authentic constitution-making than the need to address
challenges and problems unknown to the eighteenth century Federal Framers. The reputation of
James Madison and his contemporaries hardly intimidated subsequent state constitutional
delegates. They felt perfectly adequate to the task of constitution-making because the nature of
the enterprise had substantially changed since the ―early days of the republic‖ when ―government
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was yet but an experiment.‖ 41 Thus, contrary to the hero worship frequently encountered in
today‘s perception of the Federal Framers, nineteenth century convention delegates perceived
their work as part of a progressive science of constitution-making, as they confronted more
difficult and sophisticated issues of economic and commercial regulation than those faced by the
country‘s first constitution-makers.42 And in so doing, they built upon and enriched the tradition
of American Constitutionalism—a value that must be recognized and appreciated as an important
part of that tradition.
II. A More Complete Paradigm of American Constitutionalism
A. The Often-Ignored Early Tradition
After the Revolution, Americans were committed to the principle that all the
constitutions they drafted to establish their new governments had to rest on the concept of a
sovereign source linked to the people. In the course of drafting state constitutions, identifying the
sovereign was relatively straightforward: the people of each state formed the collective sovereign
behind each state constitution. In the case of the Federal constitution drafted in 1787, identifying
its sovereign source proved to be a more challenging question. That constitution divided
governmental power between the national and state governments and that division created a
puzzle in identifying the sovereign of the Federal constitution. The Federal constitution initially
invited two different views of the collective sovereign that underlay that constitution--either the
people of the discrete states acting collectively, or one undifferentiated national American
people. Ultimately three iterations of that sovereign source were advanced before the Civil
War—the national people, the people in the states collectively, or the states themselves. Despite
the different possibilities, the key point is that in both the federal and state context the central
question remained how to identify the sovereign that underlay the written constitution.
Most importantly, there were many more instances of struggles over the legitimating
authority of the collective sovereign at the state level both before and after the Federal
constitution than were ever raised with respect to the Federal constitution. Indeed, the very
attribute that is used to discredit state constitutions (their frequent revision) made it more likely
that such questions of constitutionalism would arise in the state context. Thus, the study of state
constitutions provides substantially greater opportunities to explore how Americans have
struggled over the constitutional authority of ―the people.‖
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After declaring independence, Americans saw themselves as revolutionaries, but not as
rebels. They maintained this distinction because they had exercised a people's collective right to
cast off an abusive king— George III. But in rejecting the king, Americans had no ready
replacement with a traditional claim on their loyalty. Few American revolutionaries worried
about this. In creating governments to replace those established under the authority of the king,
Americans saw themselves as the sovereign, giving rise to a distinctive constitutionalism in
America that would prove extraordinarily powerful and difficult to control.
America‘s theory of government did not break novel intellectual ground. The idea of
basing government on the people‘s authority and consent had clear seventeenth and eighteenth
century roots—extending as far back as the Glorious Revolution.43 Even before Independence,
some supporters of the American cause in Britain saw the colonists‘ struggle as vindicating ―the
rights of sovereignty…in the people themselves.‖44 Thus, American revolutionaries did not
discover the people‘s sovereignty. Rather, they inherited that idea and put it to powerful use.45
Actually building governments on that foundation, however, was new to world history. As a
South Carolina pamphleteer observed, Americans could fashion their own governments because
they had freed themselves from ―the control of hereditary rulers and arbitrary force.‖46 It made
America‘s revolution, John Adams noted in 1776, ―the most compleat, unexpected, and
remarkable of any in the History of Nations.‖47 Their chief innovation and enduring
constitutional legacy came from actually involving the people in forming and re-forming new
governments.48 Yet, the profound question remained how much power would they permit
themselves to exert.
43
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The British constitution was a product of tradition and history and was not enacted, but
simply existed. The written American constitutions were the express and unilateral orders of the
new American sovereign—the people. The written nature of American constitutions was a
crucial characteristic of the process of establishing governments, making state constitutional
revisions a valuable window into the minds of American sovereigns.49
Written state constitutions adopted in the 1770s reflected Americans‘ belief that they
could, as Thomas Paine explained in Common Sense, exercise their ―power to begin the world
over again.‖50 A congressional delegate from Connecticut, Oliver Wolcott, described America's
constitution-making in 1776 as a ―Real‖ and not a theoretical expression of the people's will.51 In
a Fourth of July oration in 1778, historian David Ramsay captured the challenge of America's
constitutions: ―We are the first people in the world who have had it in their power to choose their
own form of government.‖52
Defining ―constitutionalism‖ to include the underlying source of legitimacy on which
written constitutions rest in America directs our attention to the constitutional legacy of the
American Revolution. That legacy, of course, entailed the recognition of sovereignty of the
people not only as the justification for independence, but as the indispensable basis for the new
American governments created in the wake of the Revolution. The written constitutions that
created those governments—both at the state and ultimately at the national level—rest on the
idea of a collective sovereign—the American people.53
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The authority of the people as the justification for the new governments created in the
wake of the Revolution was universally shared and accepted by American patriots. Much more
problematic and difficult was grappling with the implications of a collective sovereign, including
identifying who ―the people‖ were, what they could do and when one knew when ―the people‖
had acted or ―spoken.‖ These questions were enormously important, and the answers led to some
ambiguity, but included powerful ideas of great consequence.
The ambiguity surfaced repeatedly in the course of the struggle to control the meaning of
the collective sovereign within American constitutionalism because ―the people‖ potentially
played overlapping roles under a written constitution. First, the people acted as the empowering
sovereign, when they created, amended, revised, or even abolished the constitution. As the
collective sovereign, however, the people were not limited in revising their constitution through
constitutional revision procedures. As the sovereign, they were ultimately free to use and invoke
their authority as they saw fit.
In creating the new American constitutions, the people also created a structure for a
republican form of government. Because government was subordinate to the people and
representatives were the people‘s agents, the people might act in a second more focused capacity
as ―the ruler‖ to monitor the constitutional order established under their authority. One way they
did this—but not the only way—was through the electoral process in which they selected
legislative representatives and state executives. These elections were not acts by a ―sovereign.‖
They were simply choices by ―the ruler‖ to designate agents to run the government, much the
way a sovereign king might select ministers. As electors, they could refuse to continue those
agents of government in office for any reason.
American constitutions also accommodated a role for the people as ―the ruled.‖ In this
third capacity the people—as individuals or in groups—had rights granted by the constitution to
express their views on the policy and conduct of the government or even on the constitutionality
of government actions. In so acting they did not act with the authority of the collective sovereign.
When the people petitioned government or assembled to express their views they were simply
engaged in a political role anticipated for the people in governments framed by constitutional
authority. After the fact, it is possible to identify how the idea of a collective sovereign lent itself
to these varying understandings of the role of ―the people.‖ At the time, however, eighteenthcentury Americans were rarely explicit about these multiple roles.
Differentiating among the people acting as the collective sovereign, as ―the rulers‖ or as
―the ruled‖ was not easy because the distinctions were subtle. Thus, it should not be surprising
that Americans before the Civil War struggled mightily to come to terms with the
constitutionalism launched by the Declaration of Independence. Ideas of a collective sovereign
were expounded and acted upon in the course of winning the Revolution, but the different roles
the people might play as a consequence of accepting the concept of a collective sovereign were
not a figment of the revolutionary imagination. The belief that the people collectively ruled could
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be sustained despite the knowledge that ―government is always something other than the actual
people who are governed by it, that governors and governed cannot be in fact identical.‖54
Americans believed that the people were simultaneously the sovereign and the ruled
during constitution-making of the revolutionary-era. This raised the question of whether the
people, as the newly recognized sovereign in America, could ever ―oppress‖ itself, justifying the
right of revolution that Americans had exercised in 1776. As expressed in the Declaration of
Independence, natural law taught that the people were ―endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights‖ and could alter or abolish government ―destructive‖ of those rights. 55 For
Thomas Jefferson the Declaration was the last-ditch effort of an oppressed people—the position
many Americans saw themselves in 1776. Jefferson‘s litany of colonial grievances showed that
Americans met their burden to exercise the natural law right of revolution. Invoking the right of
revolution in the wake of declaring Independence implicitly assumed the existence of two parties
to the contract, one of whose breach warranted Independence. But as America‘s new
constitutions merged the ruler and ruled into one, they created anomalies in how and whether the
right of revolution might apply in post-revolutionary America.
The constitutional logic of recognizing the people as the sovereign may have suggested
that the right of revolution no longer applied in America. This did not develop instantly or
uniformly after the establishment of American governments. Some of the first state constitutions
included ―alter or abolish‖ provisions that mirrored the traditional right of revolution. For
example, Maryland‘s 1776 bill of rights acknowledged that ―whenever the ends of government
are perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual,‖ the people could ―reform the old, or establish a new government.‖56
54

EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA
282 (1988).
55

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). Both natural law and English constitutional doctrine
provided a basis for the colonists to exercise a right to revolt against a monarch‘s oppression. See FRITZ, AMERICAN
SOVEREIGNS, 13-14.
56

Maryland 1776 Constitution, Bill of Rights, Sec. 4, Nov. 3, 1776 in THE DECISIVE BLOW IS STRUCK: A
FACSIMILE EDITION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1776 AND THE FIRST
MARYLAND CONSTITUTION (Edward C. Papenfuse & Gregory A Stiverson, eds., 1977). Even state constitutions
like Maryland‘s —that resembled a traditional right of revolution harkening back to the natural law precondition of
oppression—were not necessarily interpreted after the Revolution as limiting their use. In 1787, Maryland‘s
legislators debated whether that state‘s 1776 ―alter or abolish‖ provision could only be used by the people if they
were oppressed. Some Maryland legislators agreed that the people could resist their governors if those officials
subverted the purposes of government as declared in the constitution. Yet this extreme situation was not an
indispensable precondition. The Revolution, noted one legislator, William Paca, established that government‘s
―power is derived from the people…to be exercised for their welfare and happiness.‖ As ―the judges‖ of when they
think ―it is not so employed,‖ the people could ―announce it by memorials, remonstrances, or instructions.‖
Government officials risked being voted out of office if they ignored such efforts ―or if the magnitude of the case
requires it‖ the people could resume ―the powers of government.‖ Thus, in one breath, Paca canvassed the
possibilities of the people acting as ―the ruled‖ by exerting political pressure, ―the ruler‖ by exercising their electoral
power, and the collective sovereign if they reclaimed their ultimate sovereignty. William Paca to Alexander Contee
Hanson, May 10, 1787 in REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT AND THE REVOLUTION: THE MARYLAND
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1787 at 117 (Melvin Yazawa, ed., 1975).

16

Other state constitutions adopted different versions of this right to ―alter or abolish‖ that
did not sound like the traditional right of revolution. For example, Virginia's 1776 constitution
spoke only of the people‘s right to change government ―inadequate‖ or ―contrary‖ to its rightful
purposes while Pennsylvania‘s 1776 constitution spoke of the people being able to ―alter, or
abolish‖ government in any manner ―judged most conducive‖ to the public welfare.57
Increasingly, however, as Americans included it in their state constitutions, the right of
revolution came to be seen as a constitutional principle permitting the people as sovereign to
control government and revise their constitutions without limit. In this way the right broke loose
from its traditional moorings of resistance to oppression. The alter or abolish provisions could
now be read with a different meaning so that it was consistent with the constitutional principle
that in America, the sovereign was the people.58
Significantly, while such an ―alter or abolish‖ provision failed to make its way into the
Federal constitution, Federalists—and most prominently James Madison—clearly identified the
source of authority of their handiwork and drafting of a constitution as resting on the sovereignty
of the people. Madison repeatedly argued that the Federal constitution drafted in Philadelphia
would only come to life with the ―breath‖ of the sovereign people.59 Moreover, he made it clear
that whatever irregularities there might have been in altering America‘s first Federal
constitution—the Articles of Confederation—the sovereignty of the people would cure any of
those procedural defects.60
B. The Persistence of An Active Exercise of the People‘s Sovereignty
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This understanding of constitutionalism as including the source of legitimacy derived
from ―the people‖ was not confined to the founding generation. It persists today as the reason for
why we attribute legitimacy to written constitutions as fundamental law, and questions of
constitutionalism continue to challenge Americans as the heirs of the constitutional legacy left by
the Revolutionary generation. Indeed such questions will continue to confront American society
as long as the sovereignty of the people remains our constitutional touchstone. In coming to
terms with that history and constitutional legacy, the experience of state constitutions is not
merely part of the debate over American constitutionalism. Rather, state constitutions are the
focal point and the principal arena within which conversations and debate over questions of
constitutionalism have taken place (and will continue to take place). In the final analysis, that
fact offers the compelling justification for a constitutional paradigm that puts state constitutions
front and center.
Re-orienting our conventional frame of reference challenges the assumption that
American constitutionalism developed in a ―straight-line‖ from 1787. Instead of confining our
interest to what fifty-five delegates drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, attention is
now due to the thousands of delegates grappling with constitution-making in well over two
hundred state constitutional conventions since the Revolution. That wider framework will force
us to acknowledge that a so-called ―American‖ constitutionalism cannot be distilled from the
experience with the Federal constitution alone.
In drafting and revising nineteenth century constitutions, American constitution-makers
repeatedly acknowledged that ―alter or abolish‖ provisions were ―practical‖ principles that gave
American republics their ―distinctive character.‖61 In Virginia's 1829 convention, James Monroe
observed, ―Ours is a Government of the people: it may properly be called self-government. I
wish it may be preserved forever in the hands of the people. Our revolution was prosecuted on
those principles, and all the Constitutions which have been adopted in this country are founded
on the same basis.‖62 In Pennsylvania‘s 1837 constitutional convention, one delegate described
the ―alter or abolish‖ provision as ―a living and governing principle‖ and asserted that the people
―have never parted with their inalienable right to alter, reform, or abolish their government.‖63
Even delegates who refused ―to join in the wild shout—Vox Populi, Vox Dei—the voice of the
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people, is the voice of God!‖ believed, along with ―every true republican‖ that ―the people are
the only true source, from which power can emanate.‖64
Debate over a proposal for a ten-year moratorium on constitutional amendments in
Pennsylvania‘s 1837 convention reflected the consensus about the sovereign authority in
America. Such a moratorium, asserted one delegate, conflicted with the people‘s inherent ―right
to alter, reform or abolish their government, in such manner as they may think proper.‖65
Accordingly, ―When the people feel the need of a change, and see in your constitution the
assertion of their right to make such change, whenever they may deem fit, they will not always
wait five or nine years, for the opportunity of doing it in a particular mode.‖66 Preserving ―peace,
order, and republican government‖ meant giving ―the people the sovereignty‖ and ―its exercise at
all times.‖67 Although frequently disagreeing with the first speaker, another delegate joined in
opposing the moratorium. Equally ―averse to tying up the hands of the people,‖ he thought ―they
ought not to be debarred from having their wishes carried into effect,‖ whenever they wanted to
change the constitution.68 By a substantial majority the convention rejected the ten-year time
limit.69
By the late 1830s, Americans had considerable experience drawing upon the people‘s
inherent authority to justify constitutional revision in the absence of provisions for change or
which did not follow constitutional procedures. In 1837, James Buchanan—a lawyer, senator
from Pennsylvania, and future Democratic President—justified constitutional conventions
meeting under the direct authority of the sovereignty of the people. The issue of the
constitutional authority of the sovereign people surfaced repeatedly during the post-revolutionary
era when western territories sought statehood.70 Tensions were longstanding between the rights
of the people in territorial regions to act on their own initiative versus the authority of Congress
to control the process under the Northwest Ordinance. Thus, when congressional debate turned
to the issue of Michigan‘s admission as a state in 1837, claims for the right of ―the people‖ to
sanction self-government were hardly new. Without waiting for Congress to pass an enabling act
inviting the Michigan territory to organize itself for statehood, the territory drafted a constitution
in a constitutional convention held in 1835. Speaking on the floor of Congress, Buchanan
described the situation of a people confronted by a legislature that persistently refused to reform
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voting rights and political representation. Under those circumstances, Buchanan would seek ―to
persuade the people to hold a convention of their own‖ and ―call upon them peaceably and
quietly to exert their own sovereign authority in effecting a change in their form of government.‖
Such a step, he insisted, was not ―sedition or rebellion.‖71
Although the Civil War altered the terms of constitutional debate and shaped how
Americans thought about the nature of the Union and the sovereign source of the Federal
constitution, it did not dispose of the question of grappling with the legitimizing authority of ―the
people‖ in revising state constitutions. This question arose early in the course of California‘s
1878 constitutional convention when the seating of a delegate was challenged. The issue was
whether an elected delegate, also a district court judge, could participate in the convention given
a provision of the existing 1849 constitution that made such judges ―ineligible to any other office
than a judicial office during their term.‖72 At one level, debate focused on interpreting the word
―office‖ and the applicability of the constitutional provision, but the issue also prompted an
extended discussion of the convention‘s ability to invoke revolutionary constitutionalism.73 The
deeper issue entailed the relevance, impact and authority of a pre-existing constitutional
provision on a later constitutional convention. During the debate the question widened to
whether the convention manifested the people‘s collective sovereignty and was therefore beyond
the control of a legislature, an enabling act, or even a pre-existing constitution.74 At the same
time the question was raised about whether constitutional conventions were constrained to act in
accordance with provisions that triggered their existence75
The debate over the power and role of the convention was framed by a committee‘s
majority report recommending seating the delegate.76 The majority report interpreted the intent
of the 1849 constitutional provision as preventing judges from using their position to advance
themselves in the executive or legislative departments. It rejected as an overly narrow and literal
interpretation that membership in the present convention constituted an ―office,‖ observing that
the 1849 constitution did not ―anticipate what should be done under a succeeding
Constitution.‖77
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The majority report emphasized the extraordinary nature of a convention. The convention
worked on a different level than the ―everyday operations‖ of the executive, legislative, or
judicial branches.78 Rather, a convention:
outranks them all; it is their creator, and fixes limits to their spheres of action, and
boundaries to their powers. It is occasional, exceptional, brief, and peculiar; it represents
the people in their primary capacity, and forms the organic, fundamental, and paramount
law of state. Its members are mere agents or delegates of the people, and they have no
power to adopt or create, but, at most, can only propose and present to the people a draft
of a constitution for their adoption or rejection.79
Therefore, confusing the process of making ―new organic law‖ with normal governmental
operations was akin to mistaking the architect of ―a grand edifice with the people who
subsequently occupy it.‖80 The breadth of the provision on constitutional revision left the people
―free to select whom they pleased.‖81 Likewise, the statute calling the convention had no
―limitation or restriction.‖82 In the final analysis, the majority could not ―assume for a moment
that the Convention which framed the present [1849] Constitution intended to trammel the
succeeding generation in any such manner in the formation of a new or revised organic law.‖83
A minority report of the committee, on the other hand, claimed that the majority
embraced a discredited theory of the sovereignty of constitutional conventions, a theory the
minority expressly rejected. The minority acknowledged the people as the basis of government
and their right to change that government, but in terms that presupposed adherence to procedure.
Constitutional conventions could express public opinion, but conventions that swept aside
constitutions and reduced society ―into its individual elements‖ simply implied ―revolution.‖84
The minority did not countenance such a convention nor would they accept the implication that
―every provision of the present Constitution, regulating the calling and purpose of this
Convention, may be ignored at will.‖85 Rather, the existing constitution continued to bind the
present convention.
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In the end, nineteenth century state constitutional delegates continued to disagree about
the powers of conventions. On one hand, those who argued for a more expansive potential
stressed the authority of the collective sovereign and the role of convention delegates as
representatives of this ultimate constitutional power. Their opponents emphasized the preexisting authority of prior constitutions as the manifestation of that collective sovereignty. They
insisted that until existing constitutions were changed through the procedures spelled out in those
documents, conventions possessed the limited power of merely making suggestions that required
formal ratification by the people. Both the expansive and constrained views of the collective
sovereign drew from debates over the authority of the people unleashed with the Revolution.
Most important, these late nineteenth century debates clearly demonstrate that the Federal
constitution‘s framing did not end the dialogue over American constitutionalism.
Indeed, California also provides an even more recent example of the persistence of
questions of constitutionalism during the debate over the state‘s budget crisis, exacerbated by
written constitutional provisions that constrain that state government‘s choices in dealing with its
budget.86 At one point in the debate some suggested bypassing existing constitutional revision
procedures by invoking the authority of the people. To many, such ―circumvention‖ of revision
provisions simply seems beyond the ―constitutional pale.‖ The fact that California‘s constitution
specifies the procedures for its revision seems—from the perspective of our modern assumptions
of proceduralism—to settle the matter. The point is not that the practice of earlier generations of
Americans in granting substantive authority for ―the people‖ to act directly and circumvent
procedures necessarily justifies the flirtation with circumvention in the present California debate
or that present day assumptions about proceduralism preclude such circumvention. Rather, the
debate illustrates the enduring presence of competing questions of constitutionalism that take us
back to the issue of the underlying source of constitutional legitimacy and the scope of the
authority of the people.
Conclusion
In elevating the Federal constitution to the status of the one true model of American
constitutionalism, modern scholars and commentators ignore the significance of state
constitutional developments. In doing so, they discount the deeply rooted commitment—derived
from the Revolutionary era—to the overarching authority of the people as the collective
sovereign. Indeed, in a good number of the early state constitutions the principle was expressly
articulated that the sovereign people framing those constitutions reserved to themselves the
power to exercise that sovereignty whenever they were dissatisfied with their governments. It is
that historically grounded notion of the direct and active power of the collective sovereign
potentially exercised by the people that is lost in the traditional paradigm of American
constitutionalism, and what must be included in a more accurate understanding of that concept.
Modern scholars and commentators have been comfortable in ignoring what can be
learned from state constitutional history because there is no ―alter or abolish‖ clause in the
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Federal constitution acknowledging the active constitutional role of the people beyond the
election of their government. That fact is coupled with the knowledge that the Federal Framers
gathered in Philadelphia in 1787 were fully aware of the dangers presented by Shays Rebellion
in Western Massachusetts, and other such incidents where ―the people‖ sought to exercise their
sovereign control over government. While committed to the sovereignty of the people, they
were perhaps consciously creating a government where the direct and active exercise of that
sovereignty would be carefully circumscribed by constitutionally declared procedural
requirements for change.87
A more direct and active form of the sovereignty of the people—the driving principle of
the American Revolution—may have appeared to be tamed by the structural and procedural
constraints of the Federal constitution. However, it took the experience of the Civil War to
cement proceduralism in federal constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, the possible exercise of
that more direct and active expression of a collective sovereign remained a vibrant concept
within the history of American state constitutions, both before and after 1787, and persists into
the present day. Clearly, 1787 was neither the starting point, nor the end point, of American
constitutionalism. It is only by recognizing and integrating the longer history of state
constitution-making and revision that we can forge a comprehensive and more accurate paradigm
of American constitutionalism. Doing so not only corrects the historical record; it may also help
us arrive at a more reasoned conversation over what should be a continual debate over questions
that involve the value of increased direct citizen participation in government—through the use of
the tools of the initiative and referendum, liberalized processes of constitutional amendment, or
proportional representation, just to name a few examples.
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